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I. INTRODUCTION
The ongoing litigations between the Wildgrass Oil & Gas Committee (“Wildgrass”) and, among others, the Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission (“COGCC”) serve as a microcosm of the political and legal horizons that define the microscope used to examine
Colorado oil and gas development. This set of litigations began administratively with the application for permits before the COGCC and,
over the passage of time, weaved its way through the District Court of
the City and County of Denver (the “State District Court”), the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado (the “Federal District
Court”), the Colorado Court of Appeals (the “Court of Appeals”), and
finally the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit (the
“10th Circuit”).1 As of the time of this writing, the State District Court
action remains currently unresolved since the Court of Appeals remanded the case.2 This Article will provide an overview of these litigations and the Authors’ thoughts and insights as to the political and
regulatory environment of these judicial decisions, including an emphasis on associated standing by the Court of Appeals.
This set of litigations bookends with both the regulatory law of
Colorado, as it existed prior to Jared S. Polis becoming Governor of
Colorado, and the presently reconstituted regulatory scheme enacted
thereafter. As such, these ongoing litigations provide a bridge between
an era in which the COGCC possessed, as a mandate, the development
of the oil and gas industry in Colorado to a new regulatory scheme.
The new regulatory scheme recognizes not merely the development of
the oil and gas industry, but also the inevitable competition between
1. Wildgrass Oil & Gas Comm. v. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, No.
19CA1212, 2020 WL6040180 (Colo. App. Oct. 8, 2020); Wildgrass Oil & Gas
Comm. v. Colorado, 447 F. Supp. 3d 1051 (D. Colo. 2020); Wildgrass Oil & Gas
Comm. v. Colorado, 843 F. App’x 120 (10th Cir. 2021).
2. Wildgrass Oil & Gas Comm., 2020 WL 6040180, at *1.
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population growth and energy development, climate change, and the
political repositioning of Colorado from a historically Republican
state to one where the Democratic Party claims, as its elected representatives, not merely the governor but also a majority in both the state
senate and house. While these political realities do not independently
impact the judicial determinations, it is unwise to believe that judicial
decisions are made in a vacuum without impact from these political
variables.
II. THE PARTIES
The plaintiff in these matters is Wildgrass Oil.3 As noted by all of
the Courts rendering decisions in these cases:
[T]he Plaintiff is a committee formed to assist property owners in the Wildgrass subdivision in Bromfield in matters regarding oil & gas operations and development. It is their goal
to ensure that oil & gas development in or near community
is responsibly accomplished within the laws of Colorado and
to protect the homeowners’ interest in such development.4
The defendants are disparate from case to case, but the most significant defendant in each case discussed here is the COGCC.5 The
COGCC is an administrative and regulatory entity defined by C.R.S.
Section 34-60-101, et seq., also known as the Colorado Oil & Gas
Conservation Act.6
The final significant party in these litigations is Extraction Oil &
Gas, Inc. (“Extraction”). Extraction is an oil and gas developer that
was applying for development related permits with and through the
COGCC.7
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
While these cases include a vast array of facts, for the purposes
of this Article, the facts can be shortcut by beginning with Extraction
and the City of Broomfield entering into an operating agreement
3. Wildgrass Oil & Gas Comm., 2020 WL 6040180; Wildgrass Oil & Gas
Comm., 447 F. Supp. 3d 1051 (D. Colo. 2020); Wildgrass Oil & Gas Comm., 843 F.
App’x at 121.
4. Order of Denver District Court, No. 2018CV32513, at 1 (May 13, 2019).
5. Wildgrass Oil & Gas Comm., 2020 WL 6040180; Wildgrass Oil & Gas
Comm.,447 F. Supp. 3d 1051 (D. Colo. 2020); Wildgrass Oil & Gas Comm.,843 F.
App’x at 121.
6. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 34-60-101 to 102 (2021).
7. Order of Denver District Court, No. 2018CV32513, at 1 (May 13, 2019).

346

TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L.

[Vol. 8

requiring Extraction to develop as a precondition a comprehensive
drilling plan defining which proposed oil and gas wells located within
the City’s jurisdiction would be drilled, spaced, and located.8 Wildgrass maintained that based upon its belief that the COGCC would
summarily adopt this operating agreement, Wildgrass withdrew its opposition to the applications of Extraction then pending before the
COGCC.9
In January 2018, Extraction sought approval for what amounted
to two final permits to have their spacing application approved by
COGCC.10 These permits included the Form 2 Application for Permit
to Drill (“APD”) and Form 2A Oil & Gas Location Assessment.11 This
course of action resulted in the COGCC adopting drilling and spacing
unit applications (“DSUs”) unacceptable to Wildgrass.12
IV. STATE DISTRICT COURT ACTION
Despite Wildgrass having submitted comments to COGCC objecting to these applications, the COGCC approved the pending applications of Extraction without conducting a hearing.13 Thereafter,
Wildgrass initiated its complaint in the District Court of the City and
County of Denver.14 COGCC moved for the dismissal of the claims
asserted by Wildgrass based upon a lack of standing to sue, a failure
to state a claim, a failure to exhaust its administrative remedies under
the APA, and estoppel-based principals.15 After briefing on the motion
to dismiss filed by the COGCC, Wildgrass filed a motion to amend
their complaint.16 COGCC next moved to deny the amendments based
upon notions of futility.17 Thereafter, Extraction filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the Court.18 This aligned the interests
of Extraction with the interests of the COGCC.
Following the joinder of Extraction, the State District Court
scheduled a status hearing to address the filing of the subsequent

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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lawsuit by Wildgrass in Federal District Court.19 While the newly filed
Federal District Court action was pending simultaneously with the
pre-existing case filing in the State District Court, it became necessary
for the State District Court to consider a host of procedural complications that could now arise.20 The specifics of the Federal District action
are discussed later in this Article.
While the Federal District Court action was pending, the State
District Court concurrently was taking into account the fact that the
Colorado legislature had recently enacted new statutes concerning the
COGCC, including new permit considerations which, in part, addressed challenges brought by Wildgrass in its action pending in State
District Court.21 The State District Court delayed ruling on the outstanding motion to dismiss to allow an opportunity for Wildgrass and
COGCC to discuss settlement and allow a “fluidity of the proceedings.”22 When this approach proved to be unfruitful, the State District
Court ultimately dismissed the case as explained below.
Wildgrass claimed that the COGCC, during its administrative
process, violated the Administrative Procedure Act.23 Wildgrass also
requested declaratory relief asserting denial of due process.24 Lastly,
Wildgrass made a claim of promissory estoppel based upon its perceived reliance of the operating agreement entered into between Extraction and Broomfield. Wildgrass claimed that the COGCC violated
the operating agreement when it approved the ADP and Form 2A permits.25 The COGCC sought dismissal pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1),
claiming a lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the Court as Wildgrass
did not maintain standing. The COGCC further sought dismissal based
upon C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) for the failure of the plaintiff to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.26
The State District Court agreed with the COGGC’s assertion of
the lack of jurisdiction. The State District Court noted that based upon
legal authority set forth in Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission v. Grand Valley Citizens Alliance, the Colorado Supreme
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2–3; Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction, Wildgrass Oil & Gas Comm. v. Colorado, 447 F.Supp.3d 1051 (D. Colo. 2020) (No. 19CV-00190-RBJ).
21. Order of Denver District Court, No. 2018CV32513, at 2–3 (May 13, 2019).
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 5.
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Court had established that the COGCC’s Rules did not entitle a citizens’ group such as Wildgrass to seek a rehearing on specific permitting issues because such a citizens’ group was not one of the individuals or entities enumerated by statutes or regulations entitled to request
a hearing.27 The Colorado Supreme Court in Grand Valley Citizens’
Alliance noted that in issues involving APDs or Form 2A permits, the
permit approval of the COGCC was not the equivalent of a rule, regulation, or order, any of which would have allowed a requested hearing.28 The Court emphasized that the COGCC possessed the discretion, but not any obligation, to consider a citizens’ group challenge.29
Such legal authority is clear that the COGCC is not required to consider such a citizens’ group challenge, and because no citizens’ group
has any legal right to participate in proceedings where the COGCC
issues a permit, any reliance upon (or lack of reliance upon) the operating agreement is not the concern of such citizens’ group.30 Dismissal
thus became appropriate.31
The State District Court first seized upon the distinction between
the discretionary latitude afforded to the COGCC to allow participation in and requesting of a hearing as sought by the citizens’ group at
issue here (Wildgrass). It next held that the mere fact that the COGCC
declined to allow Wildgrass to request or participate in such a hearing
was entirely allowed by the law.32 As a result, based upon the discretionary authority of the COGCC, Wildgrass had lost no legal right
when its request for a hearing was not allowed by the COGCC.
The State District Court further found that Wildgrass could not,
as a matter of law, sustain its burden of proof that the issuance of any
permits by the COGCC resulted in an injury to a legally protected legal
right of Wildgrass.33 In essence, the State District Court found that
Wildgrass did not possess any legally protected interest as contemplated by either the Colorado Oil & Gas Act or the Constitution of
Colorado.34 The State District Court concluded by noting that where a
plaintiff lacks standing to assert error, the Court thereafter lacks

27. Id. at 4; Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Grand Valley Citizens’
All., 279 P.3d 646, 649 (Colo. 2012).
28. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 279 P.3d at 648.
29. Order of Denver District Court, No. 2018CV32513, at 3–4 (May 13, 2019).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 4.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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jurisdiction to entertain those claims.35 The State District Court thereafter articulated numerous grounds supporting the dismissal of both
the claim for declaratory relief and the claim for promissory estoppel
of Wildgrass, the latter of which this Article does not discuss.36
Although the State District Court ruled that it should dismiss all
three claims for lack of standing, the Court nonetheless addressed the
arguments of COGCC based upon C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5).37 The State District Court noted that pursuant to case law set forth in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face.38 The State District Court further concluded that any reliance
of Wildgrass on agreements between Extraction and the City of
Broomfield did not satisfy the elements of promissory estoppel, as the
State District Court believed that there existed no promise made to
Wildgrass by either Extraction or the City of Bromfield in its operating
agreement.39 The Court believed that had Wildgrass communicated to
COGCC that Wildgrass would withdraw their objection in the thenpending application before the COGCC because of the operating
agreement, a possible cause of action might have existed.40 However,
as there was no evidence that either Extraction or the City of Broomfield had made any promises to Wildgrass, no promiser could reasonably expect such promise would induce action or forbearance by Wildgrass.41
To this order of dismissal, Wildgrass appealed.42 The State Court
Appeal is discussed later in this Article.
V. THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT ACTION
Wildgrass’s complaint filed in Federal District Court before Hon.
Judge R. Brooke Jackson raised Forced Pooling issues would prove
no more fruitful than the proceedings before the State District Court.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 5.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)); Warne v. Hall, 373 P.3d 588, 589 (Colo. 2016).
39. Order of Denver District Court, No. 2018CV32513, at 6 (May 13, 2019).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Wildgrass Oil & Gas Comm. v. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, No.
19CA1212, 2020 WL6040180 (Colo. App. Oct. 8, 2020).
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“Pooling is the comingling of small tracts or fractional mineral
interests into a ‘drilling unit’ in order to drill a well.”43 Assuming “all
mineral owners in a drilling unit sign a lease that includes a pooling
provision, then each mineral owner will receive a royalty payment
equal to their lease royalty percentage multiplied by their proportionate share of the drilling unit acreage.”44 Some “oil and gas leases grant
the company the right to pool the owner’s interests into a production
unit . . . known as voluntary pooling.”45 Conversely, “‘Forced Pooling’ occurs when the operator cannot voluntarily pool the necessary
[acreage of] tracts or mineral interests to drill [a] well.”46 Instead, the
operator relies upon C.R.S. Section 34-60-116 to obtain pooling consent from the COGCC.47 This process seeks an administrative order
“forcing” mineral owners to “allow” the use of their legal interests in
oil and gas developments.48 The operator thus applies to COGCC for
a Forced Pooling order.49
In the complaint filed in the Federal District Court, Wildgrass
then challenged the Forced Pooling regiment allowed by C.R.S. Section 34-60-116.50 Wildgrass sought a restraining order against the
COGCC challenging the constitutionality of Forced Pooling; the
COGCC’s approval of Forced Pooling application advanced by Extraction; and the COGCC’s alleged refusal to consider health, safety,
welfare, and other environmental concerns in its decisions to allow
Forced Pooling.51
Judge Jackson noted that C.R.S. Section 34-60-116 created a process that allows oil and gas developers to apply to pool the interest of
a group of mineral owners to pursue more efficient oil and gas drilling
so as to decrease waste and avoid drilling of unnecessary wells.52
C.R.S. Section 34-60-116 was an attempt by the Colorado legislature
43. Zachary Grey, Mineral Rights–What is Forced Pooling?, FRASCONA JOINER
GOODMAN & GREENSTEIN PC (July 11, 2018), https://frascona.com/mineral-rightsforced-pooling/ [https://perma.cc /HL9Z-XWWS].
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-118(5) (2006) (“[W]ho . . . will be required to pay
at least eighty percent of the costs of the unit operation, and also by the owners of at
least eighty percent of the production or proceeds thereof . . . .”).
50. Wildgrass Oil & Gas Comm. v. Colorado, 447 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1057 (D.
Colo. 2020).
51. Id. at 1058–59.
52. Id. at 1057.
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to address the flaws in the “rule of capture.”53 Judge Jackson further
noted that pooling, as a general proposition, reduces the number of
wells drilled while simultaneously compensating mineral owners for
their share of minerals extracted.54 This is true even where a mineral
owner does not consent to the development of its mineral interests.
So as to avail themselves to a Forced Pooling order by the
COGCC, an operator must first make a “just and reasonable” offer to
the interested mineral owners, and the COGCC must thereafter provide notice of a hearing before issuing a Forced Pooling order.55 If a
court grants an order seeking Forced Pooling, the operator may, out of
any revenue produced by the wells in question, recover 100% of the
non-consenting owners’ share of equipment and operation costs and
200% of some preparation and recovery cost.56 Only after these costs
are fully recovered by the operator do the non-consenting owners become working interest owners.57
The Defendants sought to dismiss each of these claims by Wildgrass, most notably arguing as to the Federal District Court’s discretionary authority pursuant to the Burford Abstention doctrine.58 The
Burford Abstention doctrine states:
When timely and adequate state-court review is available, a
Federal Court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with
the proceedings or orders of state administrate agencies: 1.
When there are difficult questions of state law bearing on
policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transience the result in the case at bar; or Where the
exercise of Federal review of the question in a case and in
similar cases would be disruptive state efforts to establish a
coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public
concern.59
The COGCC argued that the Court should dismiss the Wildgrass
complaint pursuant to Burford Abstention as such “arises when a Federal District Court faces issues that involved complicated state

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1058.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1062.
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regulator schemes.”60 Judge Jackson thus began his legal analysis focusing on the doctrine of Burford Abstention.61
Among other things, Judge Jackson noted that the state court system already provided timely and adequate state review of any COGCC
decision.62 Judge Jackson noted that it was the willful failure of Wildgrass to raise constitutional issues in the State District Court so as to
contrive jurisdiction by the Federal Court.63 Judge Jackson noted that
“Wildgrass’s failure to pursue state court review cannot render review
unavailable.”64 The Judge further noted “the availability and adequacy
of state court review cannot be determined by Wildgrass’s failure to
pursue remedies available to them.”65 Judge Jackson based the gravamen of his position upon his concern that invoking Federal Jurisdiction would “disrupt the state of Colorado’s attempt to ensure uniformity in the application of the Forced Pooling statute.”66
As stated eloquently by Judge Jackson:
In Burford itself Plaintiff brought a constitutionality claim to
challenge the reasonableness of a state agency’s grant of an
oil drilling permit. The claim challenged the administrative
proceeding in which the permit was granted. Resolution of
the case depended on review of the state agency’s application
of state-law factors and was therefore likely to create conflicts between federal and state law. I see a similar risk.67
Judge Jackson then noted:
Though Wildgrass asks me to determine whether § 30-60116 is constitutional, in substance what it actually is asking
is that I determine whether the COGCC correctly applied §
34-60-116. Not only would I have to consider whether the
COGCC correctly applied the statute in this particular instance, but whether the COGCC has previously approved
and can continue to approve forced pooling for non-migratory mineral extraction, a question of state statutory interpretation that is difficult and controversial. To me, this looks
like a state law question in federal law clothing, one that
would bring this court into an area of state political

60. Id. (citing Lehman v. City of Louisville, 967 F.2d 1474, 1478 (10th Cir.
1992)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1063.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1064.
67. Id. (citations omitted).
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controversy and could easily create conflicts between state
and federal interpretations.68
As with the State District Court, Judge Jackson also addressed the
COGGC’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim here under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).69
Initially, Judge Jackson reviewed the claims asserted by Wildgrass that Forced Pooling violated its First Amendment rights in that
it required Wildgrass as a non-consenting mineral interest to associate
with oil and gas companies as well as forcing Wildgrass to “subsidize
private speech” of oil and gas companies.70 Judge Jackson found that
“there is no evidence that the operators recoveries are for expressive
purposes as opposed to what it is expressly meant to compensate,
namely operators costs.”71
The Federal District Court next found there was no evidence that
there was any association amongst Wildgrass property owners with oil
and gas operators that were in any way expressing speech.72 Judge
Jackson relied upon Janus v. American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees, Council 31, et al., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018),
in which the United States Supreme Court determined that forced contribution to a labor union violated the First Amendment rights of employees as union dues thereafter funded the union’s representation of
employees in the collective bargaining process.73 Judge Jackson did
not find persuasive the argument that Forced Pooling in Colorado subsidized private speech of an operator noting: “In Janus, non-union
member employees were required to pay dues that would directly fund
union speech in collective bargaining.”74
Lastly, Judge Jackson entertained the argument of Wildgrass that
Forced Pooling arrangements in Colorado were a form of a taking involving the “Takings Clause” as set forth in the United States Constitution.75 The Judge initially noted that Wildgrass never pursued its
remedies in the State District Court under circumstances where the
State District Court was fully available to consider such arguments.76
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1066.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1066–68.
73. Id. at 1067 (citing Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emp. Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2018)).
74. Id. (citing Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464).
75. Id. at 1069.
76. Id.
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Judge Jackson also noted that Colorado recognized mineral property
owners’ “correlative rights” in obtaining “a just and equal profit share”
from a “common source or pool” of resources while preventing
waste.77
Judge Jackson found that it was well within the COGCC’s state
police powers to regulate oil and gas so as to “serve the public interest[] in curbing waste, protecting correlative rights, and protecting the
economy of the state” of Colorado.78 He concluded that Forced Pooling served a public service, conceding that while Wildgrass had
demonstrated the existence of a protected property interest, it had not
shown that the taking of any property interest did not serve a public
purpose.79 The Judge further found that the statutory regiment in Colorado did not violate the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution as there was no existing contractual relationship relied upon
by Wildgrass.80 Colorado law as set forth in Grant Bros. Ranch, LLC
v. Antero Res. Piceance Corp., 409 P.3d 637 (Colo. App. 2016), where
the Colorado Court of Appeals found that no contract existed between
operators and the non-consenting owners forced to pool pursuant to
C.R.S. Section 34-60-116, supports this analysis.81
Ultimately, Jackson dismissed the entirety of the Federal District
Court action brought by Wildgrass.82 Again, Wildgrass appealed.83
VI. THE STATE COURT APPEAL
Despite these litigation setbacks, Wildgrass found success with
the Colorado Court of Appeals.84 The Court of Appeals raised the issue of an associated standing as set forth in Colorado Union of Tax
Payers Foundation v. City of Aspen.85
The Court of Appeals noted that the State District Court did not
address whether Wildgrass had associated standing to pursue its claim
77. Id. at 1070 (citing City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil and Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d
573, 580, 582 (Colo. 2016)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1070–71.
81. Id. at 1071; Grant Bros. Ranch, LLC v. Antero Res. Piceance Corp., 409 P.3d
637, 643 (Colo. App. 2016).
82. Wildgrass Oil & Gas Comm., 447 F. Supp. 3d at 1071.
83. Wildgrass Oil & Gas Comm. v. Colorado, 843 Fed. Appx. 120 (10th Cir.
2021).
84. Wildgrass Oil & Gas Comm. v. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, No.
19CA1212, (Colo. App. Oct. 8, 2020).
85. Id. at 8 (citing Colo. Union of Taxpayers Found. v. City of Aspen, 418 P.3d
506 (Colo. 2018)).
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seeking judicial review of the COGCC approval of the drilling permits.86 The issue arose as to whether the COGCC violated the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act by not considering possible associated standing of Wildgrass.87
The Court of Appeals next observed that invoking a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction requires standing.88 Further, a party may raise
issues as to subject-matter jurisdiction at any time during the course
of a proceeding.89 The Court of Appeals thus elected to address for the
first time on appeal the claim that Wildgrass had associated standing.90
This was not an issue raised or decided in the State District Court.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals commented that Form 2 and
Form 2A applications were “integrally related” and in tandem constituted a final step in securing approval from the COGCC to commence
oil and gas operations upon a Forced Pooling arrangement.91 The
Court of Appeals noted that Wildgrass had submitted to the State District Court “a number of affidavits alleging that its members suffer direct and imminent harm from the Commission’s permit approvals.”92
These injuries were a result of the issuance of the permits by the
COGCC, and, hence, the Wildgrass members had adequate proximity
to the operation in question.93
The Court of Appeals, therefore, found that Wildgrass had
demonstrated that at least one of its members would suffer an injuryin-fact as a result of the permit approvals by COGCC and that the injury in question would be a legally protected interest.94 Because at
least a single Wildgrass member possessed standing to sue in their
own right, the legal interests that Wildgrass sought to protect were
germane. Wildgrass, therefore, had adequately exhibited associated
standing to pursue its claim.95 The Court of Appeals concluded contrary to the State District Court that Wildgrass possessed standing, and
therefore, the State District Court had jurisdiction. The matter was remanded to the State District Court.96
86. Id. at 8 n.5.
87. Id. at 5, 8 n.5.
88. Id. at 8 n.5 (citing Weld Air & Water v. Colo. Oil and Gas Conservation
Comm’n, 457 P.3d 727 (Colo. App. 2019); id. at 9.
89. Id. at 8 n.5 (citing Hansen v. Long 166 P. 3d 248, 250 (Colo. App. 2007)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 11.
92. Id. at 12.
93. Id. at 12–13.
94. Id. at 13.
95. Id. at 18.
96. Id. at 25.

356

TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L.

[Vol. 8

VII. FEDERAL COURT APPEAL
On February 1, 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the ruling of Judge Jackson concluding that the
Federal District Court’s decision to abstain based upon Burford discretion was not an abuse of discretion. The Tenth Circuit relied upon
authority set forth in Marshall v. El Paso Natural Gas Company.97
VIII. CURRENT STATUS
The State District Court case has been remanded to the District
Court of the City and County of Denver. The case is pending and unresolved as of March 9, 2022.
IX. CONCLUSION
While the issues raised in the Federal District Court have now
drawn to a conclusion, the Wildgrass case continues to remain unresolved in the State District Court as of the date of this Article. The
ultimate result of this case is not yet known.
The Wildgrass litigations discussed in this Article are significant.
They represent the appreciation of the Colorado Courts that, in the first
instance, the federal courts will not be intervening in Forced Pooling
disputes for the reasons stated by both the Court of Appeals and Judge
Jackson in his reliance on Burford Abstention. That resulting reluctance of the federal courts to intervene comes as no surprise.
Only the state courts, not the federal courts, can grant relief as to
the COGCC. The federal courts, as such, pertain to the regulatory
practices of the COGCC and will abstain from the application of the
Administrative Practices Act.
More importantly, the Colorado Court of Appeals, by invoking
the doctrine of associated standing, significantly broadened the scope
of participants in the regulatory practices to non-traditional stakeholders; here, a citizens’ group has a place in the regulatory process and,
more specifically, in matters pending before the COGCC. Whether
Wildgrass is ultimately successful or not in this dispute is perhaps immaterial. This is because the real significance is that the doctrine of
associated standing has been judicially applied to COGCC proceedings. While the decision of the Court of Appeals was not published,
97. Wildgrass Oil & Gas Comm. v. Colorado, 843 Fed. Appx. 120, 122 (10th
Cir. 2021) (citing Marshall v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1373, 1377 (10th Cir.
1989)).

2022]

PERSPECTIVE ON WILDGRASS OIL & GAS COMMITTEE

357

this opinion is still significant law in Colorado. The Wildgrass opinion, hence, provides a roadmap hereafter for citizens’ groups to participate in the COGCC regulatory process in a manner in which they
heretofore have not been able. The position is consistent with the
changing demographic and political landscape of Colorado. As oil and
gas production is more frequently pursued in areas of greater population density, it is no surprise that standing is afforded to not only operators and the COGCC but also impacted stakeholders.

